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Abstract 
Using a sample of private manufacturing SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) in the period 
2007-15, we analyze the effect of government support on firms’ financial performance in Vietnam. 
Contrary to many previous studies, we find that government support affects firms’ financial 
performance after controlling for heterogeneity, unobservable factors and dynamic endogeneity. 
The finding supports the viewpoint of institutional theory. Also, the study reveals that assistance 
measures, such as tax exemptions, soft loans and investment incentives to promote financial 
performance, are vital for the development of Vietnamese private SMEs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Theoretically, the linkage between government support and firm financial performance cannot be 
predicted directly by any single theory. Institutional theory emphasises the effectiveness of 
government subsidies as a catalyst for external investments, and Takalo and Tanayama (2010) 
show that firms receiving government support may give a positive signal to market-based 
financiers. As a result, they may receive higher external investment than their counterparts without 
such support. Also, government support can result in additional funding sources to provide firms 
with more resources where sources are limited. Furthermore, private enterprises may overcome 
institutional and other barriers on an uneven playing ﬁeld through the efficiency of government 
support (Hansen, Rand, & Tarp, 2009). Consequently, firms with government support will increase 
R&D input and thus improve their performance (Wu, 2016). 
On the other hand, rent-seeking viewpoints indicate that government subsidies will not 
necessarily be distributed effectively because the granting of subsidies is not based on a firm’s 
promising prospects or social contribution. As a result, subsidies based on social networks or 
political connections are not beneficial to company performance. Such biases in government 
support tend to increase distortion in the efficient allocation of resources among companies, and 
hence may result in slow profit growth or the reduction of returns on asset and financial 
performance (Zhang, Li, Zhou, & Zhou, 2014).  
In the light of these theoretical perspectives, many empirical studies have been conducted 
in various countries. However, few studies have focused on the role of government support on the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries. In addition, the 
findings are inconclusive, making it hard to draw general inferences. For example, Fajnzylber, 
Maloney, and Montes-Rojas (2009) found that government support did not significantly affect 
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profitability in Mexico. However, Hansen et al. (2009) show that government assistance helps 
firms improve their performance and survival.  
The current study differs significantly from previous ones in three ways. First, whereas 
most studies focus on analysis of the US and other developed countries, this study provides the 
first evidence of the role of government support on firm financial performance in Vietnam. 
Furthermore, different types of government support can have varying effects on firm financial 
performance. In our study, we go beyond the extant literature by examining the effect of various 
types of government support on firms’ financial performance. Finally, in methodology, the 
majority of previous studies (e.g., Zhang et al., 2014) often consider the linkage between 
government support and firm financial performance using OLS for pooled or panel data regression. 
However, such approaches cannot overcome several empirical challenges, such as the endogeneity 
of explanatory variables. More importantly, the presence of potential dynamic endogeneity can be 
understood as a firm’s past financial performance affecting current performance. Following 
Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012), we overcome these problems by using a two-step system 
dynamic panel GMM model.  
 This paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the background and literature 
for the research. The data sources and analysis framework are discussed in Section 3. Empirical 
results are presented in Section 4. The final section offers a summary and conclusions. 
2. The background of government support and its role in SME performance 
 
Recognizing that SMEs, especially private firms, are a critical engine for Vietnamese economic 
growth, the government of Vietnam has set up supporting measures and issued various decrees. 
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Table 1 lists a series of policy measures, including financial access, human resource development, 
technical support and trade and export promotion for SMEs in Vietnam.  
Table 1: Overview of government support for SMEs through various periods of time. 
2001 
Decision No. 193/2001/QD/-TTg, issued on 20 December 2001 by the Prime Minister, on the promoting for the 
establishment and operation as well as credit guarantees for SMEs.  
2002 
Circular No. 86/2002/TT-BTC, issued on 27 September 2002 by the Ministry of Finance, on guiding the 
utilisation of the budget in support of trade and export promotion activities. 
2003 
Decision No. 12/2003/ QD-TTg, issued on 17 January 2003 by the Prime Minister, on the functions, 
responsibility and membership of the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Promotion Council. 
 
Decision No. 104/203/QD-BTM, issued on 24 January 2003 by the Ministry of Trade, on promulgating the 
regulations for the formulation and management of national key trade promotion programs. 
 
Decision No. 185 QD-BKH, issued on 24 March 2003 by the Chairman of the Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Promotion Council, on the promulgation of an operational statute for the Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development Promotion Council. 
 
Decision No. 290/QD-BKH, issued on 29 July 2003 by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, on the 
establishment of technical assistance centres for SMEs in Hanoi, Da Nang and Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
Decision No. 504/QD-BKH, issued on 29 July 2003 by the Ministry of Planning and Investment, on the 
functions, responsibility and organisational structure of the Agency for the Development of Small and Medium 
Enterprises. 
 
Directive No. 27/2003/CT-TTg, issued on 11 December 2003 by the Prime Minister, on continuing to step up 
the implementation of the enterprise law and encouraging SME development. 
2004 
Decision No. 115/2004/QD-TTg, issued on 25 June 2004 by the Prime Minister, on revision and amendment to 
the statute for the establishment, organisation, and operation of the credit guarantee fund for SMEs promulgated 
in decision No. 193/2001/QD-TTg, issued on 20 December 2001 by the Prime Minister. 
 
Decision No. 143/2004/QD-TTg, issued on 10 August by the Prime Minister, on approval for the Human 
Resources Development Assistance Program for SMEs. 
 
Circular No. 93/2004/TT-BTC, issued on 29 September 2004 by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Circular on regulations for the Credit Guarantee Fund for SMEs. 
 
Guidelines of the Ministry of Planning and Investment for implementation of the SME Human Resource 
Development Program, 24 November 2004. 
2005 
Resolution No. 144/2005/TB-BKH, issued on 07 October 2005 by the SME Council, on the SME Development 
Plan 2006-2010. 
Directive No. 40/2005/CT-TTg, issued on 16 December 2005 by the Prime Minister, on the enhancement of 
support for the development of SMEs. 
2006 
Circular No. 01/2006, issued on 20 February 2006 by the State Bank of Vietnam, on the contribution of capital 
to guarantee credit for SMEs. 
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Decision No. 236/2006/QD-TTg, issued on 23 October 2006 by the Prime Minister, on approval of the SME 
Development Plan 2006-2010. 
Decision 48/2006/QD-BTC, issued on 14 September 2006 by the Ministry of Finance, on the new accounting 
system for SMEs. 
2007 
Directive No. 22/2007/CT-TTg, issued on 26 October 2007 by the Prime Minister, on the development of non-
state enterprises. 
2009 
Decree No. 90/2001/ND-CP on support for the development of SMEs was replaced by Decree No. 56/2009/NĐ-
CP, issued on 30 June 2009 by the government.  
2012 
Decision No. 1231/2012/QD-TTg, issued on 07 September 2012 by the Prime Minister, concerning approval of 
the development plan for SMEs 2011-15. 
2016 
Decision No.89/2015/QH13 shows strong commitment and willingness on the part of the government to support 
and develop SMEs. 
Source: Authors’ synthesis from documents of the Agency for Small and Medium Enterprise development, Ministry 
of Planning and Investment. 
 
Although these policies cover all the various aspects of support for SMEs, difficulties in 
their implementation still exist because of unclear and unrealistic requirements (Le, 2010). For 
example, a recent decree (56/2009/ND-CP) lists types of support that SMEs can receive from the 
government. In practice, however, the guidelines are not clear or lack sufficient detail (Anh, Mai, 
Nhat, & Chuc, 2011). Consequently, it takes much time and effort for SMEs to receive the support 
offered. In addition, although the leading role of the state sector has been removed, discrimination 
against non-state SMEs still exists. In addition, corruption remains widespread (Nguyen & Van 
Dijk, 2012; Vu, Tran, Nguyen, & Lim, 2018). According to CIEM (2010), Vietnamese SMEs are 
likely to make informal payments for receiving support from the government. Hence, when 
assessing financial performance, it is not clear whether the benefits of government support 
outweigh the costs or vice versa. The context motivates us to evaluate whether government 
assistance is beneficial to the financial performance of firms and if so, how?  
The literature has documented many studies considering the linkage between government 
support and firm performance (Cowling, 2010; Lerner, 1999; Rotger, Gørtz, & Storey, 2012). 
However, the linkage between government assistance and the performance of SMEs has attracted 
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little empirical attention. On the one hand, some studies show that government support has little 
effect on SME performance. For example, using a panel dataset on SMEs in the Japanese 
manufacturing industry, Honjo and Harada (2006) reveal that government initiatives played an 
inconsequential role in SME sales, employment and revenues.  
On the other hand, Doh and Kim (2014) explore the effects of governmental policies on 
SME innovation in regional strategic industries in South Korea, using technological development 
assistance funds as a proxy. Results from empirical models indicate that a positive relationship 
exists between technological support and innovation performance. The study suggests that 
governmental financial aid is important for SME innovation.  
The objective of another study was to analyse the impact of public support on Spanish SME 
performance, considering technological and economic results. Empirical evidence corroborates the 
direct, positive influence of support on the technological assets of participants. From the economic 
performance point of view, economic indicators are positively influenced by the improvement in 
technological background (Barajas, Huergo, & Moreno, 2017).  
In some cases, mixed results are found in each study. For example, Morris and Stevens 
(2010) evaluated the impact of a New Zealand government support program on participating firms, 
using a new firm-level panel dataset for 2000-2006. They found that the program achieved 
significant positive results for sales, although the effect on added value and productivity was less 
conclusive. Maggioni, Sorrentino, and Williams (1999) examined how the most important 
government program to encourage entrepreneurship in Italy affected several aspects of the early 
performance of new firms. Results showed that the public program produced mixed effects. 
Government aid allowed firms to acquire a higher level of technology, but government funding 
gave rise to entrepreneurial start-ups, which are not always fully efficient.  
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Few contributions deal with the influence of government support on SME performance in 
developing countries and these still reach different conclusions.  Fajnzylber et al. (2009) consider 
the role of diverse types of government support on firm performance in Mexico. Their research 
found that the significant intra-country differences in firm productivity observed in developing 
economies were due in part to market and government failures that limit the ability of micro-firms 
to reach their optimal sizes. However, in another article, Wei and Liu (2015) examine the effect of 
government support in the Chinese context and consider a different type of effect, on the 
innovation performance of firms. They divided government support into what they term “vertical 
and horizontal support,” and adopted an empirical research approach in their study. In their 
discussion of results, the authors highlighted that vertical support, in the form of direct research 
and development (R&D) subsidies, and horizontal support, in the form of regional innovation 
policy, have a positive effect on the innovation performance of firms.  
In Vietnam, a growing literature examines the role of government support in firm 
performance. Several studies show that government support is an effective tool to improve firm 
growth and survival (e.g., Hansen et al., 2009). Other research reveals that the effect of government 
support on firm performance is negligible or insignificant (Vu, Holmes, Tran, & Lim, 2016).  
However, the evidence about the linkage between government support and firm financial 
performance is little known, especially for private SMEs. In addition, there is limited 
understanding of the effect of types of government support on firms’ financial performance. 
Investigating subsidies as a whole instead of types of subsidy may obscure the real effect of 
government support on firm performance. More precisely, few studies have examined the 
relationship between government support and SMEs’ financial performance with reference to 
developing countries, particularly Vietnam, considering the effect of government assistance and 
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types of support on SME financial performance. Hence, the contribution of this study will be to 
fill the gap in the literature by using a dynamic GMM approach to consider the role of government 
support on firms’ financial performance in the Vietnamese domestic SME manufacturing context.  
 
3. Data and Econometric Models 
3.1. Data 
This study utilizes the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Survey – Enterprise Development in 
Vietnam (Copenhagen Centre of Development Research – University of Copenhagen). The 
surveys are conducted in collaboration with two central Vietnamese partners: the Central Institute 
for Economic Management (CIEM) and the Institute of Labour, Science and Social Affairs 
(ILSSA).1 
The surveys focus on manufacturing SMEs in Vietnam and were conducted every 2 years, 
in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015. The surveys cover 10 provinces (Ho Chi Minh City, 
Hanoi, Hai Phong, Long An, Ha Tay, Quang Nam, Phu Tho, Nghe An, Khanh Hoa and Lam Dong) 
and three regions (South, Central and North). However, this study uses an unbalanced panel dataset 
in 19 manufacturing sectors from 2007 to 2015 because information concerning types of 
government support is not available for 2005.  
To provide a comprehensive analysis of different types of SME, the surveys follow a 
stratified random sampling method according to ownership structures. The surveys provide a wide 
range of indicators of firm characteristics, including ownership, industry, enterprise history, 
government support, types of government support, financial performance and other information. 
                                         
1 For more details concerning data, see Cuong, Rand, Silva, Tam, and Tarp (2008).  
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This dataset made it possible to analyze the impact of government support on the financial 
performance of Vietnamese SMEs.  
A common problem with time-variant data is that they are often expressed in current prices. 
Therefore, our data on current variables are deflated to 1994 prices using GDP deflators to avoid 
biases that might arise because of inflation. A statistical description of the main variables in our 
regression estimations is given in Table 2 below.2 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the main variables in the model 
Variable 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
ROA 0.22   1.73 0.266 0.58 0.241 0.65 0.307 1.72 0.35 0.94 
ROE 0.21 2.27 0.37 3.32 0.34 3.08 0.31 1.88 0.42 1.49 
Government 
assistance 
0.23 0.42 0.32 0.46 0.143 0.35 0.115 0.31 0.084 0.27 
Financial 
support 
0.196 0.39 0.292 0.45 0.101 0.302 0.097 0.29 0.052 0.22 
Technical 
support  
0.04 0.198 0.027 0.164 0.028 0.167 0.022 0.14 0.006 0.08 
Innovation 0.48 0.49 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.197 0.39 0.33 0.47 
Bribes  0.267 0.44 0.342 0.47 0.38 0.486 0.445 0.49 0.42 0.495 
Export 0.058 0.23 0.057 0.23 0.06 0.23 0.062 0.24 0.07 0.255 
Firm size in log 2.08 1.17 2.06 1.16 1.81 1.15 1.73 1.15 1.78 1.15 
Firm age in log 2.35 0.71 2.42 0.73 2.38 0.67 2.55 0.63 2.62 0.63 
Leverage 0.11 0.273 0.10 0.23 0.079 0.19 0.07 0.24 0.087 0.235 
Observations   2518 2527         2417   2424 2486 
Source: authors’ calculation from the SME survey, 2007-2015. 
 
 
3.2. Econometric models 
 
To quantify the role of government support in firm financial performance, we apply a dynamic 
model approach. Such approaches have become increasingly important in recent years to deal with 
the dynamic nature of economic processes (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). It is this dynamic nature 
which renders problematic traditional estimation techniques, including ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and fixed-effects (FE) (Flannery & Hankins, 2013; Wintoki et al., 2012). As shown in many 
                                         
2 Definitions and measurements of the variables in Table 2 are explained in Appendix 1. 
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previous studies (e.g., Wintoki et al., 2012), empirical models using firm financial performance as 
a dependent variable must be examined in a dynamic framework in which lagged dependent 
variable(s) are considered as explanatory variable(s). 
Technically, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable(s) as independent variables of the 
empirical models allows researchers to control for unobserved historical factors which have 
potential influence on current firm performance, in this way reducing omitted variable bias 
(Wooldridge, 2009). Thus, guided by previous studies (Wintoki et al., 2012), the empirical 
approach taken in this study is specified below:  
 
𝑌௜௧ = 𝛼଴ + ∑ 𝑎௦𝑌௜௧ି௦୩௦ୀଵ + 𝛿௠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡,௜௧ + 𝛽௞𝑍௞,௜௧ + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠+𝜇௜ + 𝜗௜௧                                                                                        (1)   
 
Where Yit is the financial performance (as measured by ROA or ROE) of firm i in year t ; 
𝛼ଵ is the estimated coefficient on a one-year lagged dependent variable; government support is 
widely defined as a dummy variable to reduce measurement errors. This is the main interest 
variable in the model. In this study, we measure government support as a set of variables. First, it 
is measured as a dummy, based on the question whether firms have received assistance. In addition, 
the type of government support is measured on the basis of the question about what assistance 
firms have received.  
Z is a vector of firm-level explanatory variables used in the model as guided by previous 
studies (e.g., firm size, firm age, innovation and leverage). We also control for potential influences 
arising from differences across industries, using dummy variables for industry classification.  𝜇௜ 
represents time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics; 𝜔௧  denotes time-specific effects which 
are time-variant and common to all firms. These time-specific effects are captured by year dummy 
variables; 𝜀௜௧  is the classical error term. 
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The information from the past can be captured sufficiently by two lags of the dependent 
variable (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009). However, when we ran a specification in which current 
financial performance is a dependent variable regressed on two lags of past performance, and using 
other covariates as in model (1), an insignificant effect of Yit-2 on current firm financial 
performance was found. This result implies that a one-year lagged dependent variable as an 
explanatory variable in a first-order autoregressive [AR(1)] structure is enough to control for 
potential dynamic endogeneity. The specification with AR(1) structure is consistent with the 
arguments of previous studies (Zhou, Faff, & Alpert, 2014), which show that an AR(1) structure 
appears to be unavoidable when almost all panel datasets used in corporate finance research are 
short. Hence, the panel specification model (1) with an AR(1) structure  can be written as below. 
𝑌௜௧ = 𝛼଴ + 𝛼1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿௠𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡௜௧ + 𝛽௞𝑍௞,௜௧ + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠+𝜇௜ + 𝜗௜௧                                                  (2) 
 
      For the estimation approach, the pooled OLS (OLS) and the OLS with fixed-effects 
(FE) methods will provide inconsistent estimations in the presence of the AR(1) structure and 
endogenous explanatory variables (Flannery & Hankins, 2013). Some studies use a traditional IV 
approach. However, findings from a set of external instrumental variables seem infeasible when 
almost no independent variables are considered to be exogenous. Consequently, we use the 
system generalized method of moments estimator (System GMM) proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) to correct for this inconsistency and these challenges. This estimator is superior to 
OLS or fixed effects in controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across firms, 
simultaneity, and dynamic endogeneity (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Wintoki et al., 2012).  
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4. Empirical results and discussion 
This section describes the results of the empirical analysis. Table 3 column 1 shows the effect of 
government support on firm financial performance when using the OLS approach for pooled data, 
while Table 3 column 2 shows estimated results after controlling for unobservable time-invariant 
factors. Table 3 column 3 provides dynamic two-step GMM regressions with basic estimation, 
while columns 4 to 6 report the results from the estimation of extended specifications. 
Table 3: The impact of government support on firm financial performance 
VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
 Pooled FE Dynamic 
GMM 
Pooled FE Dynamic 
GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lagROA   0.1541** 0.3199*** -0.2378** 0.1449** 
  (0.078) (0.083) (0.117) (0.072) 
Government 
support 
-0.0069 0.0071 0.0393** -0.0100 -0.0110 0.0360* 
(0.020) (0.030) (0.018) (0.023) (0.042) (0.022) 
Firm size in log -0.0386*** -0.0356 0.0093 -0.0273 -0.0460 0.0076 
(0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.020) (0.081) (0.019) 
Firm age in log -0.0575*** -0.0094 -0.0260 -0.0106 -0.0106 -0.0319 
(0.019) (0.032) (0.033) (0.017) (0.032) (0.030) 
Innovation     -0.0186 0.0226 -0.0100 
   (0.017) (0.039) (0.016) 
Bribes    -0.0593*** -0.0606 -0.0219 
   (0.018) (0.048) (0.014) 
Export    0.1035** -0.0667 0.0590 
   (0.043) (0.078) (0.065) 
Leverage    0.1633** 0.0268 0.0543 
   (0.083) (0.063) (0.065) 
Tobacco sector -0.2869*** -1.9228*** -0.5671 -0.2346*** -4.8737 -0.5766* 
(0.042) (0.438) (0.392) (0.048) (4.634) (0.343) 
Textiles sector -0.1932*** -1.6025*** -0.3966** -0.1083** -4.0579 -0.3794** 
(0.041) (0.241) (0.180) (0.055) (4.043) (0.148) 
Apparel sector -0.0622 -1.7300*** -0.4956*** -0.0655 -4.3637 -0.4900*** 
(0.050) (0.250) (0.183) (0.047) (4.049) (0.159) 
Leather sector -0.1386*** -1.8842*** -0.3414* -0.1470*** -4.2218 -0.3512* 
(0.049) (0.239) (0.180) (0.045) (4.044) (0.180) 
Wood sector -0.1612*** -1.8002*** -0.3577*** -0.1294*** -4.1454 -0.3619*** 
(0.032) (0.193) (0.127) (0.037) (3.978) (0.108) 
Paper sector -0.1764*** -1.4617*** -0.5449** -0.1298*** -3.1901 -0.5147** 
(0.033) (0.199) (0.228) (0.033) (3.054) (0.222) 
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Publishing and 
printing sector 
-0.1455*** -1.6363*** -0.3952* -0.1236** -4.0945 -0.4513** 
(0.046) (0.253) (0.208) (0.054) (3.921) (0.223) 
Refined petroleum 
sector 
-0.2538*** -1.6566*** -0.3372* -0.1868*** 0.0806 -0.3111* 
(0.042) (0.415) (0.178) (0.057) (0.055) (0.161) 
Chemical products 
sector 
-0.2057*** -1.8033*** -0.4449 -0.1170** -3.9307 -0.4395* 
(0.041) (0.246) (0.271) (0.050) (3.880) (0.240) 
Rubber sector -0.1551*** -1.8992*** -0.5570*** -0.0849 -4.2615 -0.5382*** 
(0.042) (0.199) (0.191) (0.052) (4.054) (0.175) 
Non-metallic 
mineral products 
sector 
-0.1447*** -2.0073*** -0.4248* -0.0805** -4.6997 -0.4424*** 
(0.035) (0.225) (0.170) (0.036) (4.587) (0.149) 
Basic metals 
sector 
-0.0932 -2.4409*** -0.7329** 0.0441 -5.5722 -0.6767** 
(0.105) (0.235) (0.329) (0.161) (5.247) (0.317) 
Manufactured 
metal products 
sector 
-0.1373*** -2.4779*** -0.6075** -0.0910** -5.5478 -0.5443** 
(0.036) (0.197) (0.280) (0.039) (5.306) (0.251) 
Electronic 
machinery, 
computers, radio 
sector 
-0.1599*** -2.3480*** -0.6179** -0.0702 -5.3180 -0.6699** 
(0.040) (0.228) (0.274) (0.047) (5.004) (0.303) 
Motor vehicles 
sector 
-0.2290*** -2.4262*** -0.5500 -0.1435*** -4.9746 -0.4145 
(0.045) (0.278) (0.359) (0.050) (4.682) (0.267) 
Other transport 
equipment sector 
-0.1718** -2.4131*** -0.4621** -0.2107** -5.5234 -0.4966** 
(0.069) (0.329) (0.183) (0.090) (5.050) (0.226) 
Furniture, 
jewellery, music 
equipment sector 
-0.1790*** -1.8185*** -0.3932*** -0.1235*** -4.1706 -0.3907*** 
(0.036) (0.194) (0.133) (0.039) (4.061) (0.120) 
Recycling sector -0.2286*** -2.4582*** -0.6768** -0.0881 -5.3350 -0.6048** 
(0.076) (0.342) (0.282) (0.113) (5.110) (0.258) 
Constant 0.5723*** 1.7284*** 0.0000 0.3587*** 3.6483 0.6157*** 
(0.101) (0.152) (0.000) (0.083) (3.243) (0.173) 
Observations 12,331 12,331 7,783 7,775 7,775 7,775 
R-squared 0.010 0.023  0.039 0.064  
Number of panels  4,418 3,120  3,120 3,120 
AR(1) test (p-
value) 
  0.094   0.095 
AR(2) test (p-
value) 
  0.792   0.753 
Hansen test of 
over-identification 
(p-value) 
  0.993   0.961 
Diff-in-Hansen 
tests of exogeneity 
(p-value) 
  0.530   0.612 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The models also control for time dummies and ownership. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Following Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), firm age and year dummies are considered to be 
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exogenous. 
Source: authors’ calculation from the SME surveys, 2007-2015. 
Table 3 above presents the results of the effect of government support on firms’ financial 
performance. Regarding the role of the government support covariate in determining firms’ 
financial performance, pooled data estimations reveal that government assistance has a statistically 
insignificant influence on ROA. However, the results may be biased because of the absence of 
control for unobservable characteristics in the model. Attempting to control for time-invariant 
unobserved features and overcome the challenges noted above, we apply two-step dynamic GMM 
systems as guided by Wintoki et al. (2012). It should be noted that OLS and fixed effects methods 
may provide more efficient estimations than the GMM system if explanatory variables are not 
endogenous. Hence, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is implemented for all independent variables as a 
group if they are actually endogenous. According to Schultz, Tan, and Walsh (2010), one-year 
lagged differences in explained covariates, such as ∆𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡௜௧ି , 
∆𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔௜௧ିଵ, ∆𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛௜௧ିଵ, 𝐵𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒௜௧ି , ∆𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡௜௧ିଵ, and ∆𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒௜௧ିଵ, are 
considered instrumental variables, with year dummies and firm age in log considered as exogenous 
variables. The results of the test show that the null hypothesis is rejected at the traditional level of 
significance (1%). The endogeneity of regressors is of concern, so it is necessary to apply the 
GMM system in this study (Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests for endogeneity of covariates are used).  
The results of the specification test are reported in Table 3. A serial correlation test of the 
AR(2) yields p-values of 0.792 and 0.753. In addition, we determine the validity of the system 
GMM estimation by applying a Hansen-J test for overidentification. The result is displayed in the 
last row of Table 3. The P-values of the Hansen-J test are 0.993 and 0.961 respectively. These 
results suggest that the GMM system instrumental variables used in this study are valid. 
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In addition, Table 3 reports the results from an exogeneity test of a subset of our 
instruments that show a P-value of 0.53 and 0.612. These results suggest that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis of the exogeneity of the additional subset of instruments used in the GMM system 
estimates.  
Interestingly, a totally different picture emerges when using two-step GMM regression. As 
reported in Table 3 column 3, the effect of government support on firms’ financial performance 
becomes significant after controlling for unobservable characteristics and dynamic endogeneity. 
This finding reflects the fact that the results from OLS regression are biased. Specifically, the 
estimated coefficient of government support shows that firms with government support achieve 
nearly 4% better financial performance than firms without such support. The positive, significant 
effect of government support on firm financial performance is further confirmed in extended 
specifications and the results are displayed in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3.   
With regard to the impact of past firm financial performance, the estimated results in Table 
3 show a positive, significant effect on current performance, when unobservable factors are 
controlled for by using a dynamic two-step general system. This finding agrees with the empirical 
results of recent studies (e.g., Wintoki et al., 2012). These results show the importance of controlling 
for unobservable characteristics and also imply that past firm financial performance is a vital 
variable in considering the dynamic nature of the factors affecting current performance. Ignoring 
this variable in the model can result in researchers failing to capture the real effect of government 
support on firms’ financial performance. 
To provide additional insight into the linkage between government support and firm financial 
performance, this study explores several additional scenarios. First, different types of government 
support may have various effects on firm financial performance. Accordingly, this study explores 
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the role of types of government support on firm performance. Interestingly, government technical 
support for trade activities, training of personnel and technology, has no statistically significant 
influence on firms’ financial performance. However, government financial support has a positive 
influence on SME financial performance and obviously includes such assistance as tax 
exemptions, tax reductions, or loans from the Vietnam Development Bank (VDB) or Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policy with preferential interest rate support.  
Also, Table 4 shows that exporters tend to achieve better financial performance than non-
exporters and this ﬁnding is consistent with previous studies (e.g., Vu et al., 2014). Furthermore, 
the results of columns 3 of Table 4 also show the positive relationship between ﬁnancial leverage 
and financial performance covered by the dynamic two-step GMM model when the potential 
sources of endogeneity and unobservable factors are taken into account. This finding supports the 
argument of González (2013), who suggests that a ﬁrm with higher ﬁnancial debt may force 
directors into value-maximizing decisions to cope with the higher debt pressure. Consequently, 
such actions improve firms’ productivity and financial performance.  
Second, many Vietnamese SMEs are not formally registered and government assistance 
programs may depend on whether the firm is registered (Loayza, 1997). Accordingly, the linkage 
between government support and firm financial performance is examined further in each sub-
group, taking into account the formal status of firms. As one would expect, Table 4 shows that 
government financial assistance is beneficial for registered but not for unregistered firms. The 
reason may be that the informality may prevent firms from taking full advantage of government 
support (Loayza, 1997).  In addition, the absence of account books and other required documents 
hinders unregistered firms from accessing and using these forms of support effectively (CIEM, 
2010). 
Table 4: The effect of types of government support on firm financial performance 
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VARIABLES ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA 
 Pooled FE Dynamic GMM3 
   Whole sample Formal firms Informal firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
lagROA   0.1481** 0.0173* 0.0332 
  (0.015) (0.008) (0.090) 
Financial support -0.0059 0.0068 0.0383** 0.0177+ -0.0760 
(0.022) (0.031) (0.015) (0.010) (0.211) 
Technical support -0.0620+ -0.0123 -0.0103 -0.0099 -0.0811 
(0.032) (0.043) (0.034) (0.023) (0.230) 
Innovation  -0.0344* -0.0087 -0.0138 -0.0254** -0.1119 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.012) (0.008) (0.265) 
Bribes  -0.0578** -0.0183 -0.0221* -0.0144+ -0.0584 
(0.014) (0.020) (0.010) (0.007) (0.060) 
Export  0.1294** 0.0363 0.0607** 0.0084 0.1011 
(0.038) (0.058) (0.022) (0.010) (0.439) 
Firm size in log -0.0468** -0.0358 0.0054 0.0050 -0.0255 
(0.013) (0.053) (0.014) (0.009) (0.103) 
Firm age in log -0.0580** -0.0084 -0.0384+ -0.0261** -0.0589 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.084) 
Leverage  0.2920** 0.1390* 0.0542* 0.1200** 0.5223 
(0.092) (0.056) (0.026) (0.024) (0.958) 
Tobacco sector -0.2950** -1.9269 -0.5556** -0.2757+ -0.7972 
(0.043) (1.853) (0.214) (0.143) (2.093) 
Textiles sector -0.1945** -1.6008 -0.3669** 0.0020 -1.0619 
(0.041) (1.710) (0.100) (0.052) (2.720) 
Apparel sector -0.0592 -1.7371 -0.4907** -0.5039** -1.8866 
(0.050) (1.687) (0.093) (0.103) (3.740) 
Leather sector -0.1331** -1.8848 -0.3284** -0.2229** -0.7209 
(0.047) (1.740) (0.117) (0.068) (2.384) 
Wood sector -0.1696** -1.8036 -0.3633** -0.0944** -0.9266 
(0.031) (1.757) (0.083) (0.033) (2.598) 
Paper sector -0.1603** -1.4518 -0.5302** -0.1462** -1.2309 
(0.031) (1.401) (0.139) (0.047) (4.483) 
Publishing and 
printing sector 
-0.1307** -1.6246 -0.4624** -0.0971+ -0.6273 
(0.046) (1.616) (0.130) (0.056) (2.072) 
Refined petroleum 
sector 
-0.2773** -1.6741 -0.3153** -0.0828 -0.9575 
(0.049) (1.648) (0.084) (0.065) (2.326) 
Chemical products 
sector 
-0.1917** -1.7866 -0.4794* -0.1377* -0.6433 
(0.041) (1.725) (0.215) (0.061) (2.227) 
Rubber sector -0.1379** -1.8942 -0.5242** 0.0093 -1.1250 
(0.042) (1.793) (0.118) (0.049) (2.352) 
Non-metallic 
mineral products 
-0.1472** -2.0169 -0.4501** -0.0508 -0.4941 
(0.034) (2.050) (0.123) (0.054) (2.249) 
                                         
3 According to Rand and Torm (2012), formal firms are firms that are registered to pay taxes (have a tax code). 
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sector 
Basic metals sector -0.0838 -2.4452 -0.6772** 0.0114 -1.7575 
(0.105) (2.361) (0.126) (0.056) (4.013) 
Fabricated metal 
products sector 
-0.1281** -2.4767 -0.5519** 0.0437 -2.0708 
(0.034) (2.432) (0.119) (0.042) (4.638) 
Electronic 
machinery, 
computers, radio 
sector 
-0.1554** -2.3454 -0.6846** -0.1316** -1.4486 
(0.039) (2.268) (0.144) (0.045) (3.403) 
Motor vehicles 
sector 
-0.2197** -2.3985 -0.4118** 0.0799 -2.7431 
(0.046) (2.247) (0.137) (0.071) (6.647) 
Other transport 
equipment sector 
-0.1904** -2.4219 -0.4847** -0.2095** -0.8924 
(0.070) (2.310) (0.105) (0.041) (2.322) 
Furniture, 
jewellery, music 
equipment sector 
-0.1727** -1.8165 -0.3895** -0.0298 -1.0679 
(0.035) (1.800) (0.088) (0.035) (2.772) 
Recycling sector -0.2128** -2.4571 -0.6073** -0.1383** -0.8489 
(0.078) (2.328) (0.087) (0.027) (1.850) 
Constant 0.5829** 1.7202 0.0000 0.3065** 1.3321 
(0.104) (1.483) (0.000) (0.045) (2.552) 
Observations 12,322 12,322 7,775 4,263 1,905 
R-squared 0.014 0.024    
Number of panels  4,417 3,120 2,005 985 
AR(1) test (p-value)   0.080 0.003 0.692 
AR(2) test (p-value)   0.751 0.520 0.935 
Hansen test of over-
identification (p-
value) 
  0.934 0.661 0.764 
Diff-in-Hansen 
tests of exogeneity 
(p-value) 
  0.527 0.320 0.380 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The model also controls for time dummies and ownership. ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05, + p<0.1. Following Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), firm age and year dummies are 
considered to be exogenous. 
Source: authors’ calculation from the SME surveys, 2007-2015. 
 As a final step, the robustness of the results is checked by conducting several scenarios. 
First, as documented by Wong and Hooy (2018), political connections are typical in countries with 
weak protection of property rights and in developing countries. In addition, some studies show that 
our results may be biased, ignoring the role of political connections in investigating the relationship 
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between government support and firm financial performance (e.g., Zhang et al., 2014).4 
Consequently, in further regressions, a political connection index is added. Furthermore, the 
measure of firm financial performance (ROA) is replaced by ROE (return on equity). However, 
the positive effects of government support on firm financial performance are still recorded and the 
results are reported in Table 5 below.  
Table 5: Robustness check 
VARIABLES ROA ROE ROA ROE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
lagROA 0.1477**  0.1506**  
(0.073)  (0.074)  
lagROE  -0.0064  -0.0062 
 (0.005)  (0.005) 
Government support 0.0390* 0.0401*   
(0.022) (0.022)   
Financial support   0.0436* 0.0472* 
  (0.024) (0.026) 
Technical support   -0.0164 -0.0343 
  (0.056) (0.063) 
Firm size in log 0.0078 -0.0270 0.0067 -0.0259 
(0.019) (0.034) (0.019) (0.035) 
Firm age in log -0.0262 -0.0686 -0.0303 -0.0705* 
(0.031) (0.044) (0.035) (0.042) 
Innovation  -0.0066 -0.0083 -0.0091 -0.0098 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) 
Bribes -0.0224* -0.0140 -0.0228* -0.0139 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
Export  0.0668 -0.0047 0.0665 -0.0036 
(0.067) (0.038) (0.063) (0.039) 
Leverage  0.0635 0.3262 0.0631 0.3100 
(0.069) (0.374) (0.066) (0.370) 
Party member -0.0143 0.0534 -0.0118 0.0605 
(0.059) (0.063) (0.069) (0.064) 
Tobacco sector -0.6366* -0.7003 -0.6159* -0.7300 
(0.352) (0.479) (0.318) (0.487) 
Textiles sector -0.4084*** -0.6191** -0.3944*** -0.6124** 
(0.145) (0.275) (0.147) (0.278) 
Apparel sector -0.5203*** -0.7390** -0.5202*** -0.7341** 
(0.154) (0.344) (0.167) (0.356) 
                                         
4 According to Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou (2008), political connection is measured as a dummy variable, taking 
the value 1 if the firm owners/managers are members of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), and zero otherwise. 
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Leather sector -0.3674** -0.5349* -0.3432* -0.5316* 
(0.181) (0.283) (0.184) (0.301) 
Wood sector -0.3891*** -0.6052*** -0.3892*** -0.6122*** 
(0.101) (0.205) (0.113) (0.217) 
Paper sector -0.5528*** -0.7671** -0.5663*** -0.7650** 
(0.210) (0.343) (0.217) (0.343) 
Publishing and printing 
sector 
-0.4896** -0.6565* -0.4952** -0.6647* 
(0.226) (0.352) (0.214) (0.347) 
Refined petroleum sector -0.3305** -0.5213** -0.3285** -0.5175** 
(0.152) (0.221) (0.161) (0.226) 
Chemical products sector -0.4505** -0.9466* -0.4894** -0.9402* 
(0.228) (0.507) (0.232) (0.493) 
Rubber sector -0.5690*** -0.7893** -0.5519*** -0.7830** 
(0.180) (0.337) (0.169) (0.328) 
Non-metallic mineral 
products sector 
-0.4720*** -0.6876** -0.4784*** -0.6984** 
(0.141) (0.267) (0.159) (0.285) 
Basic metals sector -0.6956** -0.8898** -0.6919** -0.8966** 
(0.306) (0.451) (0.333) (0.449) 
Manufactured metal 
products sector 
-0.5667** -0.8354** -0.5714** -0.8329** 
(0.246) (0.418) (0.262) (0.413) 
Electronic machinery, 
computers, radio sector 
-0.7187** -0.9588* -0.7307** -0.9750* 
(0.301) (0.527) (0.298) (0.517) 
Motor vehicles sector -0.4463* -0.6223* -0.4422* -0.6167* 
(0.249) (0.323) (0.255) (0.324) 
Other transport equipment 
sector 
-0.5116** -0.7663* -0.4992** -0.7467* 
(0.223) (0.417) (0.239) (0.410) 
Furniture, jewellery, music 
equipment sector 
-0.4179*** -0.6167*** -0.4149*** -0.6193*** 
(0.114) (0.212) (0.125) (0.223) 
Recycling sector -0.6371*** -0.8078*** -0.6366*** -0.8117*** 
(0.239) (0.265) (0.243) (0.274) 
Constant 0.6157*** 1.0022*** 0.6349*** 0.0000 
(0.168) (0.319) (0.189) (0.000) 
Observations 7,775 7,772 7,775 7,772 
Number of panels 3,120 3,118 3,120 3,118 
AR(1) test (p-value) 0.093 0.032 0.093 0.031 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.758 0.876 0.771 0.882 
Hansen test of over-
identification (p-value) 
0.959 0.996 0.921 0.997 
Diff-in-Hansen tests of 
exogeneity (p-value) 
0.560 0.854 0.466 0.852 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The model also controls for time dummies and ownership. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Following Schultz, Tan and Walsh (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012), firm age and 
year dummies are considered to be exogenous. Models are estimated using dynamic GMM. 
Source: authors’ calculation from the SME surveys, 2007-2015. 
5. Conclusion and policy implications 
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Aiming to contribute to the small but growing amount of empirical evidence concerning the 
linkage between government support and financial performance, this study contributes to the 
existing literature by providing the first evidence of the influence on SME financial performance 
exerted not only by government support but also by types of government subsidy. Based on the 
empirical results, some of the main findings may be summarized as follows.  
Regarding traditional firm characteristic factors, the empirical results are generally 
consistent with other international empirical studies. For example, exporters who sell in both 
markets achieve a higher financial performance than non-exporters. In addition, leverage has a 
positive association with firms’ financial performance. Furthermore, it is not surprising that firms 
marked by corrupt behaviour turn in a lower financial performance than their counterparts that are 
free of it.  
With regard to the connection between government support and firm financial 
performance, estimates of the ordinary least squares (OLS) indicate that there is no linkage 
between the two. However, dynamic two-step GMM estimates reveal that government support has 
a positive influence on firm financial performance. Also, GMM approaches show that whereas 
financial assistance shows a positive association, technical support proves to be a negative link 
with firm financial performance. This suggests that the effect of government support on firm 
financial performance varies depending on type of subsidy.  
Regarding policy implications, changes in government financial support for firms are 
accompanied by an improvement in firm financial performance. This finding implies that private 
Vietnamese SMEs are often small so that the cancellation of subsidies will have a negative impact 
on both their growth and financial performance. Our results further show that financial support 
rather than technical assistance has a positive effect on firms’ financial performance. This suggests 
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that it is very important to focus on tax exemptions, interest rate subsidies and investment 
incentives since these may help private SMEs improve their growth and financial performance, 
especially in the present context of discrimination against non-state SMEs.  
 Vietnam is considered to be a successful example of a transitional economy, having shifted 
from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one with an annual average GDP growth 
rate of 6.8% during the 1986-2009 period (Le, 2010). Also, according to the World Bank (2012), 
Vietnam’s poverty rate fell from nearly 60% in the early 1990s to 20.7% in 2010. Accordingly, 
Vietnamese government policy may offer a good example for other transitional economies with 
similar characteristics and conditions. 
There are some limitations to the current study. It uses data from manufacturing SMEs, so 
its findings may not be representative for other enterprises. In particular, the findings may not be 
true for large enterprises which command various resources and business approaches, including 
markets and negotiating power. This suggests that further research on larger firms and other 
sectors beyond manufacturing should be carried out to draw general conclusions about the 
relationship between government support and firms’ financial performance.  
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Appendix 1: Definitions and measurements of variables in the models 
Variables Definition Measurement 
Dependent 
variables 
  
ROA Ratio of net profit to total assets Continuous 
variable 
ROE Ratio of net profit to total equity Continuous 
variable 
Explanatory 
variables 
  
Government support 1 if firms received support from the government,   
0 otherwise 
Dummy 
variable 
Financial support 1 if firms received tax exemptions or reductions or 
loans with preferred interest from the government,                  
0 otherwise 
Dummy 
variable 
Technical support 1 if firms benefited from a human resource training 
program, trade promotion program, or quality 
assurance programs from the government,            
0 otherwise 
Dummy 
variable 
Innovation 1 if firms introduced new products, applied new 
technology, or modified existing products,                      
0 otherwise (dummy variable) 
Dummy 
variable 
Bribes 1 if firms had to pay informal fees to do business, 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
variable 
Export 1 if firms participated in export markets, 0 
otherwise 
Dummy 
variable 
Firm size Total employment Continuous 
variable 
Firm age Number of years since establishment (number) Continuous 
variable 
Leverage  Ratio between total debt and total assets Continuous 
variable 
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